Abstract

This document describes the requirements on Development Tools in order to support ARMv8-M Security Extensions or the new TT instruction of ARMv8-M.

Keywords

ACLE ABI CMSE ARMv8-M Security Extensions toolchain requirements compiler linker

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LES-PRE-20349
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1 ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

1.1 Change control

1.1.1 Current status and anticipated changes
This document is release 1.0.
Anticipated changes to this document include:
- Typographical corrections.
- Clarifications.
- Compatible extensions.

1.1.2 Change history

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>By</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>23/10/2015</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>First release</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1.2 References
This document refers to the following documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Doc No</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[AAELF]</td>
<td>ARM IHI 0044E</td>
<td></td>
<td>ELF for the ARM® Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>[AAPCS]</td>
<td>ARM IHI 0042E</td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedure Call Standard for the ARM® Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ACLE]</td>
<td>ARM IHI 0053C</td>
<td></td>
<td>ARM® C Language Extensions Release 2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>[BSABI]</td>
<td>ARM IHI 0036B</td>
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<td>Application Binary Interface for the ARM® Architecture (Base Standard)</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ARMV8M]</td>
<td>ARM DDI 0553a</td>
<td></td>
<td>ARMv8-M Architecture Reference Manual[a]</td>
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1.3 Terms and abbreviations
This document uses the following terms and abbreviations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMSE</td>
<td>ARMv8-M Security Extensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAU</td>
<td>Security Attribute Unit. Controls the separation of secure and non-secure memory regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAU</td>
<td>Implementation Defined Attribute Unit. Enables system logic outside the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] As of 22 October 2015, this document is a work in progress. Contact ARM for access to it under a confidentiality agreement.
processor to separate secure and non-secure memory regions, similar to the SAU.

**MPU**
Memory Protection Unit. Controls the permissions that privileged and unprivileged execution modes have, memory region by memory region.

**NSC region**
Non-Secure Callable memory region. Secure memory that is callable by code executing in non-secure state.

**SG**
Secure Gateway Instruction. Switches to secure state.

**TT**
Test Target Instruction. Used to inspect MPU, SAU, and IDAU configurations.

**Entry function**
A function in secure memory that can be called from secure and non-secure state.

**Non-secure function call**
A function call in secure memory that switches to non-secure state.

**Secure gateway**
Occurrence of an SG instruction in a NSC region.

**Secure gateway veneer**
A code sequence that provides a secure gateway to an entry function.

**LSB**
Least Significant Bit.

**A32**
Instruction set previously known as ARM®.

**T32**
Instruction set previously known as Thumb®.

## 2 SCOPE

### 2.1 Scope

ARMv8-M Security Extensions is in some contexts known as Cortex®-M Security Extensions and is referred to as CMSE throughout this document.

This document states the requirements that development tools must satisfy in order to develop software in C that uses the feature defined by CMSE. This document describes a machine-level standard that can be mapped directly by functions written in C and assembly language.

This document also describes the support for the new **TT** instruction introduced in ARMv8-M. This instruction is not part of CMSE, but is closely related.

Some of the requirements defined by this document will be included in future [ACLE] and [BSABI] documents.

### 2.2 Conventions

This document consists of informative text and requirements.

Requirements are numbered in the left margin and highlighted as shown here.

A permanent unique reference consists of the document number, document version, and requirement number.

## 3 OVERVIEW OF CMSE

### 3.1 Introduction

CMSE is an optional part of the ARMv8-M baseline and mainline architecture defined by [ARMV8M]. CMSE is designed to combine code from multiple vendors without requiring trust between them. CMSE gives vendors the ability to protect their software assets (code and data) by restricting access to the memory where their software assets reside, except for a set of explicitly exported entry points that are defined by the vendor. This supports the creation of a trusted software stack that provides features such as secure remote firmware updates, while
significantly reducing the attack surface of such code. This is an important feature for any network-connected
device that can be updated after deployment, including any IoT device.

CMSE defines a system-wide division of physical memory into secure regions and non-secure regions and two system-wide security states that are enforced by hardware. There is a direct relation between the memory regions and the security states:

- Code executed from a non-secure region (non-secure code) is executed in non-secure state and can only access memory in non-secure regions.
- Code executed from a secure region (secure code) is executed in secure state and can access memory in both secure and non-secure regions.[a]

Attempts to access secure regions from non-secure code or a mismatch between the (secure or non-secure) code that is executed and the security state of the system results in a SecureFault.

The security states are orthogonal to the exception level, as shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1 Diagrammatic representation of secure states](image.png)

Memory regions can be defined by the system through the IDAU or can be controlled in software through the memory mapped SAU registers.

Parts of the system are banked between the security states. The stack pointer is banked, resulting in a stack pointer for each combination of security state and exception level. All parts of the system accessible in non-secure state can be accessed in secure state as well, including the banked parts.

### 3.1.1 Security state changes

The system boots in secure state and can change security states using branches as summarized in Figure 2.

[a] The sc instruction in secure memory switches to the secure state during its execution (see §3.1.1).
Transitions from secure to non-secure state can be initiated by software through the use of the BXNS and BLXNS instructions that have the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of the target address unset.

Note: The M profile architecture does not support the A32 instruction set. This allows the LSB of an address to denote the security state.

Transitions from non-secure to secure state can be initiated by software in two ways:

- A branch to a secure gateway.
- A branch to the reserved value FNC_RETURN.

A secure gateway is an occurrence of the Secure Gateway instruction (SG) in a special type of secure region, named a Non-Secure Callable (NSC) region. When branching to a secure gateway from non-secure state, the SG instruction switches to the secure state and clears the LSB of the return address in lr. In any other situation the SG instruction does not change the security state or modify the return address.

A branch to the reserved value FNC_RETURN causes the hardware to switch to secure state, read an address from the top of the secure stack, and branch to that address. The reserved value FNC_RETURN is written to lr when executing the BLXNS instruction.

Security state transitions can be caused by hardware through the handling of interrupts. Those transitions are transparent to software and are ignored in the remainder of this document.

### 3.2 The TT instruction

The ARMv8-M architecture introduces the Test Target instruction (TT). The TT instruction takes a memory address and returns the configuration of the Memory Protection Unit (MPU) at that address. An optional T flag controls whether the permissions for the privileged or the unprivileged execution mode are returned.

When executed in the secure state the result of this instruction is extended to return the SAU and IDAU configurations at the specific address.

The MPU is banked between the two security states. The optional A flag makes the TT instruction read the MPU of the non-secure state when the TT instruction is executed from the secure state.

The TT instruction is used to check the access permissions that different security states and privilege levels have on memory at a specified address.

### 3.3 Secure code requirements

To prevent secure code and data from being accessed from non-secure state, secure code must meet at least the requirements listed in this section. The responsibility for meeting these security requirements is shared between hardware, toolchain and software developer. The remainder of this document specifies requirements a toolchain must meet to enable C programmers to meet these security requirements.
3.3.1 Information leakage

Information leakage from the secure state to the non-secure state may occur through parts of the system that are not banked between the security states. The unbanked registers that are accessible by software are:

- General purpose registers except for the stack pointer (r0-r12, r14-r15).
- Floating point registers (S0-S31, D0-D15).
- The N, Z, C, V, Q, and GE bits of the APSR register.
- The FPSCR register.

Secure code must clear secret information from unbanked registers before initiating a transition from secure to non-secure state.

3.3.2 Non-secure memory access

When secure code needs to access non-secure memory using an address calculated by the non-secure state, it cannot trust that the address lies in a non-secure memory region. Furthermore, the MPU is banked between the security states. Therefore secure and non-secure code might have different access rights to non-secure memory.

Secure code that accesses non-secure memory on behalf of the non-secure state must only do so if the non-secure state has permission to perform the same access itself.

The secure code can use the TT instruction to check non-secure memory permissions.

Secure code must not access non-secure memory unless it does so on behalf of the non-secure state.

Data belonging to secure code must reside in secure memory.

3.3.3 Volatility of non-secure memory

Non-secure memory can be changed asynchronously to the execution of secure code. There are two causes:

- Interrupts handled in non-secure state can change non-secure memory.
- The debug interface can be used to change non-secure memory.

There can be unexpected consequences when secure code accesses non-secure memory:

```c
int array[N]
void foo(int *p) {
    if (*p >= 0 && *p < N) {
        // non-secure memory (*p) is changed at this point
        array[*p] = 0;
    }
}
```

When the pointer `p` points to non-secure memory, it is possible for its value to change after the memory accesses used to perform the array bounds check, but before the memory access used to index the array. Such an asynchronous change to non-secure memory would render this array bounds check useless.

Secure code must handle non-secure memory as volatile.

The above example shows a case that can be handled by the developer as follows:

```c
int array[N]
void foo(volatile int *p) {
    int i = *p;
    if (i >= 0 && i < N) {
        array[i] = 0;
    }
}
```

Situations that the toolchain must handle are described in §5.1.

3.3.4 Inadvertent secure gateway

An SG instruction can occur inadvertently. This can happen in the following cases:
• Uninitialized memory.
• General data in executable memory, for example jump tables.
• A 32-bit wide instruction that contains the bit pattern 1110 1001 0111 1111 in its first half-word that follows an SG instruction, for example two successive SG instructions.
• A 32-bit wide instruction that contains the bit pattern 1110 1001 0111 1111 in its last half-word that is followed by an SG instruction, for example an SG instruction that follows an LDR (immediate) instruction.

If an inadvertent SG instruction occurs in an NSC region, the result is an inadvertent secure gateway.

5 Memory in an NSC region must not contain an inadvertent SG instruction.

The secure gateway veneers introduced in §3.4.3 limit the instructions that need to be placed in NSC regions. If the NSC regions contain only these veneers, an inadvertent secure gateway cannot occur.

3.4 Development tools

3.4.1 Source level security state changes
Development tools are expected to provide C and assembly language support for interacting between the security states. Code written in C++ must use extern “C” linkage for any inter-state interaction.

6 Security state changes must be expressed through function calls and returns.

This provides an interface that fits naturally with the C language.

A function in secure code that can be called from the non-secure state through its secure gateway is called an entry function. A function call from secure state to the non-secure state is called a non-secure function call. This is shown in Figure 2 on page 8.

3.4.2 Executable files
There are two different types of executable files, one for each security state. The secure state executes secure code from a secure executable file. The non-secure state executes non-secure code from a non-secure executable file. The secure and non-secure executable files are developed independently of each other.

A non-secure executable is unaware of security states.

From the point of view of the non-secure state, a call to a secure gateway is a regular function call, as is the return from a non-secure function call. It is therefore required that a non-secure executable file can be developed using a toolchain that is not aware of CMSE.

Developing a secure executable file requires toolchain support whenever a function is called from, calls, or returns to non-secure state and whenever memory is accessed through an address provided by the non-secure state. The secure code ABI is otherwise identical to the non-secure code ABI.

The interaction between developers of secure code, non-secure code, and (optional) security agnostic library code is shown in Figure 3.
The secure gateway import library, shortened to *import library*, contains the addresses of the secure gateways of the secure code. This import library consists of or contains a relocatable file that defines symbols for all the secure gateways. The non-secure code links against this import library to use the functionality provided by the secure code.

A relocatable file containing only copies of the (absolute) symbols of the secure gateways in the secure executable must be available to link non-secure code against.

Linking against this import library is the only requirement on the toolchain used to develop the non-secure code. This functionality is very similar to calling ROM functions, and is expected to be available in existing toolchains.

### 3.4.3 Secure gateway veneers

A toolchain must support generating a *secure gateway veneer* for each entry function with external linkage. It consists of an \( \text{SG} \) instruction followed by a \( \text{B.W} \) instruction that targets the entry function it veneers.

Secure gateway veneers decouple the addresses of secure gateways (in NSC regions) from the rest of the secure code. By maintaining a vector of secure gateway veneers at a forever-fixed address, the rest of the secure code can be updated independently of non-secure code. This also limits the amount of code in NSC regions that potentially can be called by the non-secure state.

A secure gateway veneer must be labelled by an ELF symbol that has the same binding, type, and name as the function it veneers, following the rules for C entities as defined by [AAELF].

To prevent duplicate symbol names, an entry function will “lose” its standard symbol when its secure gateway veneer is created. For instance, the compiler could use weak symbols for entry functions.

A toolchain must support creating a vector of secure gateway veneers consisting of one or more veneers placed consecutively in memory.

Vectors of secure gateway veneers are expected to be placed in NSC memory. All other code in the secure executable is expected to be placed in secure memory regions. This placement is under the control of the developer.

Preventing inadvertent secure gateways as described in §3.3.4 is a responsibility shared between a developer and their toolchain. A toolchain must make it possible for a developer to avoid creating inadvertent secure gateways.
12 Excluding the first instruction of a secure gateway veneer, a veneer must not contain the bit pattern of the SG instruction on a 2-byte boundary.

13 A vector of secure gateway veneers must be aligned to a 32-byte boundary, and must be zero padded to a 32-byte boundary.

The developer should take care that the code or data before the vector of secure gateway veneers does not create an inadvertent secure gateway with the first secure gateway veneer in the vector. ARM recommends placing the vector of secure gateway veneers at the start of a NSC region.

14 The position of secure gateway veneers in a vector must be controllable by the developer.

This last requirement gives the developer complete control over the address of a secure gateway veneer. It allows the developer to fix the addresses of the secure gateway veneers such that secure code can be updated independently of non-secure code.

Figure 4 shows the memory layout of a secure executable.

![Memory Layout Diagram]

---

### 3.4.4 Example C level development flow of secure code

The example in this section shows the creation of a secure executable and its corresponding import library starting from C sources. The example uses some features that are described later in this document.

The interface visible to non-secure code is defined in the header file `myinterface.h` as follows:

```c
int entry1(int x);
int entry2(int x);
```

The implementation of this interface is given by the following C code:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
#include "myinterface.h"

int func1(int x) { return x; }
int __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) entry1(int x) { return func1(x) ; }
int __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) entry2(int x) { return entry1(x); }
```

In addition to the implementation of the two entry functions, the code defines the function `func1()` which can only be called by secure code. The example C source is not a complete application in itself. The main entry point function is very platform dependent so is not included in this example.

When a compiler translates the above C code, it could produce the following assembly:

```
func1:    BX lr
entry1:  
```
An entry function does not start with an SG instruction but has two symbols labelling its start. This indicates an entry function to the linker.

Note that the compiler can alternatively use the __acle_se_entry1 symbol rather than the entry1 symbol in function entry2. This would make the function call skip the secure gateway veneer.

When the relocatable file corresponding to this assembly code is linked into an executable file, the linker creates the following veneers in a section containing only entry veneers:

entry1:
  SG
  B.W __acle_se_entry1
entry2:
  SG
  B.W __acle_se_entry2

Note that the section with the veneers is aligned on a 32-byte boundary and padded to a 32-byte boundary. Placement of the section with the veneers is under the control of the developer, but must be in an NSC region.

In addition to the final executable, our example linker also produces the import library for non-secure code. Assuming the section with veneers is placed at address 0x100, the import library consists of a relocatable file containing only a symbol table with the following entries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STB_GLOBAL, SHN_ABS, STT_FUNC</td>
<td>entry1</td>
<td>0x101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STB_GLOBAL, SHN_ABS, STT_FUNC</td>
<td>entry2</td>
<td>0x109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the secure executable file can be pre-loaded on the device. The device with pre-loaded executable, the import library, and the header file can be delivered to a party who develops non-secure code for this device.

### 3.4.5 Reserved names

This specification reserves the usage of:

- Identifiers starting with cmse_, case insensitive, when the arm_cmse.h header is included.
- Attribute names starting with cmse_.

### 4 TT INSTRUCTION SUPPORT

This chapter defines the language extension that provides C applications access to the TT instruction. Support for the TT instruction described here is generic to the ARMv8-M architecture, and is not part of CMSE, but is closely related.

The <arm_cmse.h> header must be included before using the TT instruction support.
4.1 Feature macro

The feature macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` describes the availability of CMSE related extensions. The macro defines a set of flags encoded as bits.

17 Bit 0 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set if the TT instruction support is available.

18 All undefined bits of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` are reserved for future use and must be unset.

The flags defined by `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` as described here and in §5 result in the following values for this macro:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 or (undefined)</td>
<td>Absence of TT instruction support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TT instruction support is available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Toolchain targets the secure state of CMSE (implies the availability of the TT instruction)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 TT intrinsics

The result of the TT instruction is described by a C type containing bit-fields. This type is used as the return type of the TT intrinsics.

As specified by [AAPCS], the endianness of a system affects the bit-offsets of bit-fields, but the result of the TT instruction is not influenced by endianness.

19 If `__ARM_BIG_ENDIAN` is unset and bit 0 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set, the following type must be declared:

```c
typedef union {
    struct cmse_address_info {
        unsigned mpu_region:8;
        unsigned :8;
        unsigned mpu_region_valid:1;
        unsigned :1;
        unsigned read_ok:1;
        unsigned readwrite_ok:1;
        unsigned :12;
    } flags;
    unsigned value;
} cmse_address_info_t;
```

20 If `__ARM_BIG_ENDIAN` is set, the bit-fields in the type defined by requirement 19 are reversed such that they have the same bit-offset as on little-endian systems following the rules specified by [AAPCS].

The size of this type is 4 bytes.

21 The unnamed bit-fields of `cmse_address_info_t` are reserved.

22 The following intrinsics must be provided if bit 0 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>cmse_address_info_t cmse_TT(void *p)</code></td>
<td>Generates a TT instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>cmse_address_info_t cmse_TT_fptr(p)</code></td>
<td>Generates a TT instruction. The argument <code>p</code> can be any function pointer type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTT(void *p)</code></td>
<td>Generates a TT instruction with the T flag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTT_fptr(p)</code></td>
<td>Generates a TT instruction with the T flag. The argument <code>p</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
can be any function pointer type.

ARM recommends that a toolchain behaves as if these intrinsics would write the pointed-to memory. That prevents subsequent accesses to this memory being scheduled before this intrinsic.

The exact type signatures for `cmse_TT_fptr()` and `cmse_TTT_fptr()` are implementation-defined because there is no type defined by [ISOC] that can hold all function pointers. ARM recommends implementing these intrinsics as macros.

### 4.3 Address range check intrinsic

Checking the result of the `TT` instruction on an address range is essential for programming in C. It is needed to check permissions on objects larger than a byte. The address range check intrinsic defined in this section can be used to perform permission checks on C objects.

The address range check intrinsic must be available if bit 0 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set. It has the following type signature:

```c
void *cmse_check_address_range(void *p, size_t size, int flags)
```

The address range check intrinsic checks the address range from `p` to `p + size - 1`.

An implementation must be aware that wraparound of an address range can occur.

The address range check fails if `p + size - 1 < p`.

Some SAU, IDAU and MPU configurations block the efficient implementation of an address range check. This intrinsic operates under the assumption that the configuration of the SAU, IDAU, and MPU is constrained as follows:
- An object is allocated in a single region.
- A stack is allocated in a single region.

These points imply that a region does not overlap other regions.

An SAU, IDAU and MPU region number is returned by the `TT` instruction. When the region numbers of the start and end of the address range match, the complete range is contained in one SAU, IDAU, and MPU region. In this case two `TT` instructions are executed to check the address range.

Regions are aligned at 32-byte boundaries. If the address range fits in one 32-byte address line, a single `TT` instruction suffices. This is the case when the following constraint holds:

\[(p \mod 32) + size \leq 32\]

The address range check intrinsic fails if the range crosses any MPU region boundary.

The SAU and IDAU support for this intrinsic is defined in §5.3.

The rest of the semantics of the address range check intrinsic depend on its `flags` parameter. This parameter can be constructed using a bitwise OR operator.

The `flags` parameter of the address range check consists of a set of values. Each value must have a macro defined for it, with the name and semantic effects as defined in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Semantic effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The <code>TT</code> instruction without any flag is used to retrieve the permissions of an address, returned in a <code>cmse_address_info_t</code> structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_MPU_UNPRIV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sets the <code>T</code> flag on the <code>TT</code> instruction used to retrieve the permissions of an address. Retrieves the unprivileged mode access permissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_MPU_READWRITE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Checks if the permissions have the <code>readwrite_ok</code> field set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_MPU_READ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Checks if the permissions have the <code>read_ok</code> field set.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The address range check must fail if the flags parameter contains a value that cannot be constructed using a bitwise OR operator on the values defined by requirement 27.

The address range check intrinsic returns NULL on a failed check, and p on a successful check.

ARM recommends programmers to use the returned pointer to access the checked memory range. This generates a data dependency between the checked memory and all its subsequent accesses and prevents these accesses from being scheduled before the check.

The following intrinsic must be defined if bit 0 of macro __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE is set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmse_check_pointed_object(p, f)</td>
<td>Returns the same value as cmse_check_address_range(p, sizeof(*p), f).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cmse_check_pointed_object() intrinsic can be implemented as a macro. An example implementation is listed in §7.2. This intrinsic is a convenience wrapper for the cmse_check_address_range() intrinsic that matches the most common usage pattern in C. ARM recommends that the return type of this intrinsic is identical to the type of parameter p.

5 CMSE SUPPORT

This chapter defines the language extension that provides support for secure executable files written in the C language. Non-secure executable files do not require any additional toolchain support.

The <arm_cmse.h> header must be included before using CMSE support, except for using the __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE macro.

Bits 0 and 1 of feature macro __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE are set if CMSE support for secure executable files is available.

Availability of CMSE implies availability of the TT instruction.

A compiler might provide a switch to enable support for creating CMSE secure executable files. ARM recommends such a switch to be named -mcmse.

5.1 Non-secure memory usage

Secure code should only use secure memory except when communicating with the non-secure state. The italicized terms in this section are terms defined by [ISOC].

The storage of any object declared in a translation unit must be a register or secure memory.

The security implications of accessing non-secure memory through a pointer are the responsibility of the developer. Any other access to non-secure memory by secure code is called a "generated non-secure memory access" and is the responsibility of the C language translation system.

A generated non-secure memory read (or write) must check that the non-secure state can read (or write) this memory before accessing it.

Any attempted generated non-secure memory read (or write) to memory that is not readable (or writable) by the non-secure state must result in a call to the cmse_abort() function.

The following pseudocode describes the general code sequence for a generated non-secure memory write access at address nsaddr and of size SIZE. An implementation is not required to use this particular code sequence.

```c
addr = cmse_check_address_range(nsaddr, SIZE, CMSE_MPU_READWRITE | CMSE_NONSECURE)
if addr == 0 then
    cmse_abort()
//access to [addr, addr+SIZE-1] is now permitted
```
The macros \texttt{CMSE\_MPU\_READWRITE} and \texttt{CMSE\_NONSECURE} are defined in §5.3. The \texttt{cmse\_check\_address\_range} intrinsic is defined in §4.3 and extended in §5.3.

As mentioned in §4.3, the address range check can be done efficiently if the non-secure stack does not cross the boundary of any memory region defined by the MPU, SAU, and IDAU.

A \textit{C language translation system} must generate code to handle a generated non-secure memory access in each of the following situations:

- An entry function called from non-secure state assigns an \texttt{argument} written to memory by the non-secure state to its corresponding \texttt{parameter} (as defined by §6.5.2.2 paragraph 4 of [ISOC]);
- An entry function returns control to its non-secure caller and writes its return value to memory (as defined by §6.8.6.4 paragraph 3 of [ISOC]);
- A function call that targets the non-secure state assigns an \texttt{argument} to the corresponding \texttt{parameter} (as defined by §6.5.2.2 paragraph 4 of [ISOC]);
- A return value of a function call that targets the non-secure state is read from memory (as defined by §6.8.6.4 paragraph 3 of [ISOC]).

This is explained in more detail in §5.4 Entry functions, and §5.5 Non-secure function call.

### 5.2 TT intrinsics for CMSE

In the secure state, the \texttt{TT} instruction returns the SAU and IDAU configuration and recognizes the \texttt{A} flag. This requires the type defined in §4.2 to be extended. The additional fields are emphasized in \textbf{bold}. The size of this type is still 4 bytes.

If \texttt{__ARM\_BIG\__ENDIAN} is unset and bit 1 of macro \texttt{__ARM\_FEATURE\_CMSE} is set, the following type must be declared:

```c
typedef union {
    struct cmse_address_info {
        unsigned mpu_region:8;
        unsigned sau_region:8;
        unsigned mpu_region_valid:1;
        unsigned sau_region_valid:1;
        unsigned read_ok:1;
        unsigned readwrite_ok:1;
        unsigned nonsecure_read_ok:1;
        unsigned nonsecure_readwrite_ok:1;
        unsigned secure:1;
        unsigned idau_region_valid:1;
        unsigned idau_region:8;
    } flags;
    unsigned value;
} cmse_address_info_t;
```

If \texttt{__ARM\_BIG\__ENDIAN} is set the bit-fields in the type defined by requirement 37 must be reversed such that they have the same bit-offset as on little-endian systems following the rules specified by [AAPCS].

The following intrinsics must be provided if bit 1 of macro \texttt{__ARM\_FEATURE\_CMSE} is set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTA(void *p)}</td>
<td>Generates a \texttt{TT} instruction with the \texttt{A} flag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTA_fptr(p)}</td>
<td>Generates a \texttt{TT} instruction with the \texttt{A} flag. The argument \texttt{p} can be any function pointer type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTAT(void *p)}</td>
<td>Generates a \texttt{TT} instruction with the \texttt{T} and \texttt{A} flag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{cmse_address_info_t cmse_TTAT_fptr(p)}</td>
<td>Generates a \texttt{TT} instruction with the \texttt{T} and \texttt{A} flag. The</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
argument `p` can be any function pointer type.

Note that the `TT` intrinsics defined by requirement 22 must also be provided for the CMSE support. Implementation recommendations can be found there.

### 5.3 Address range check intrinsic for CMSE

The semantics of the intrinsic `cmse_check_address_range()` defined in §4.3 are extended to handle the extra flag and fields introduced by CMSE.

- The address range check must fail if the range crosses any SAU or IDAU region boundary.
- If bit 1 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set, the values accepted by the `flags` parameter, as defined by requirement 27, must be extended with the values defined in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Semantic effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_AU_NONSECURE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Checks if the permissions have the <code>secure</code> field unset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sets the <code>A</code> flag on the <code>TT</code> instruction used to retrieve the permissions of an address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE_NONSECURE</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Semantics of <code>CMSE_AU_NONSECURE</code> and <code>CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE</code> combined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4 Entry functions

An entry function can be called from non-secure state or secure state.

- A compiler must support declaring an entry function by using the attribute `__attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry))` on its declaration.
- ARM recommends generating a diagnostic for an entry function with static linkage.

An entry function has two ELF function (`STT_FUNC`) symbols labelling it:

- A symbol that follows the standard naming for C entities as defined by [AAELF] labels the function’s inline secure gateway if it has one, otherwise the function’s first instruction.
- A special symbol that prefixes the standard function name with `__acle_se_` labels the function’s first non-SG instruction.

The special symbol acts as an entry function attribute in the relocatable file. Tools that operate on relocatable files can use this symbol to detect the need to generate a secure gateway veneer (§3.4.3) and a symbol in the import library (§3.4.2).

A toolchain must generate a secure gateway veneer for an entry function that has both its symbols labelling the same address. Otherwise a secure gateway is assumed to be present.

To summarize, for a function symbol `foo`:

- A secure gateway veneer for `foo` is only generated if `foo == __acle_se_foo`.
- The symbol `foo` is copied to the import library if `__acle_se_foo` is present and `foo != __acle_se_foo`.

The address of an entry function must be the address labelled by its standard symbol.

This must be the address of its associated `SG` instruction, usually the first instruction of its secure gateway veneer. This veneer is labelled by the function’s standard symbol name.

#### 5.4.1 Arguments and return value

A caller from the non-secure state is not aware it is calling an entry function. If it must use the stack to write arguments or read a result value [AAPCS], it will use the non-secure stack.

A compiler compiling an entry function must do either of the following:

- Generate code to read arguments from and write results to the non-secure stack.
Constrain the number of parameters to the entry function, their types, and the type of the return value, to avoid using the non-secure stack. An entry function that would break the constraint must be diagnosed.

If a toolchain supports stack-based arguments, it must be aware of the volatile behavior of non-secure memory (§3.3.3) and the requirements of using non-secure memory (§5.1), in particular requirement 36.

In practice, a compiler might generate code that:

- Copies stack-based arguments from the non-secure stack to the parameter on the secure stack in the prologue of the entry function.
- Copies the stack-based return value from the secure stack to the non-secure stack in the epilogue.

Code that performs this copying must check the accessibility of the non-secure memory as described by the pseudocode in §5.1. An example entry function epilogue and prologue can be found in §7.4.

A possible optimization would be to access the non-secure stack directly for arguments that read at most once, but accessibility checks are still required.

The stack usage of an entry function is shown in Figure 5.

![Figure 5 Entry function’s caller stack frame](image)

### 5.4.2 Return from an entry function

An entry function must use the **BXNS** instruction to return to its non-secure caller.

This instruction switches to non-secure state if the target address has its LSB unset. The LSB of the return address in `lr` is automatically cleared by the **SG** instruction when it switches the state from non-secure to secure.

To prevent information leakage when an entry function returns, the registers that contain secret information must be cleared (§3.3.1).

The code sequence directly preceding the **BXNS** instruction that transitions to non-secure code must:

- Clear all caller-saved registers except:
  - Registers that hold the result value and the return address of the entry function.
  - Registers that do not contain secret information.
- Clear all registers and flags that have undefined values at the return of a procedure, according to [AAPCS].
• Restore all callee-saved registers as mandated by [AAPCS].

Clearing of floating-point registers can be done conditionally by checking the SFPA bit of the special-purpose CONTROL register.

A toolchain could provide the developer with the means to specify that some types of variables never hold secret information. For example, by setting the TS bit of FPCCR, CMSE assumes that floating point registers never hold secret information.

An example entry function epilogue can be found in §7.4.

Because of these requirements, performing tail-calls from an entry function is difficult.

5.4.3 Security state of the caller

An entry function can be called from secure or non-secure state. Software needs to distinguish between these cases.

The following intrinsic function must be provided if bit 1 of macro __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE is set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>int cmse_nonsecure_caller(void)</td>
<td>Returns non-zero if entry function is called from non-secure state and zero otherwise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calling an entry function from the non-secure state results in a return address with its LSB unset. This can be used to implement the intrinsic. Note that such an implementation requires a stable location for the return address.

As a consequence of the semantics of cmse_nonsecure_caller(), it always return zero when used outside an entry function. A toolchain is not required to diagnose the usage of cmse_nonsecure_caller() outside an entry function, although this might become a requirement in the future.

5.5 Non-secure function call

A call to a function that switches state from secure to non-secure is called a non-secure function call. A non-secure function call can only happen via function pointers. This is a consequence of separating secure and non-secure code into separate executable files as described in §3.4.2.

A non-secure function type must be declared using the function attribute

```c
_attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call))
```

A non-secure function type must only be used as a base type of a pointer.

This disallows function definitions with this attribute and ensures a secure executable file only contains secure function definitions.

5.5.1 Performing a call

A function call through a pointer with a non-secure function type as its base type must switch to the non-secure state.

To create a function call that switches to the non-secure state, an implementation must emit code that clears the LSB of the function address and branches using the BLXNS instruction.

Note that a non-secure function call to an entry function is possible. This behaves like any other non-secure function call.

All registers that contain secret information must be cleared to prevent information leakage when performing a non-secure function call as described in §3.3.1. Registers that contain values that are used after the non-secure function call must be restored after the call returns. Secure code cannot depend on the non-secure state to restore these registers.

The code sequence directly preceding the BLXNS instruction that transitions to non-secure code must:

- Save all callee- and live caller-saved registers by copying them to secure memory.
- Clear all callee- and caller-saved registers except:
The registers that hold the arguments of the call.

- Registers that do not hold secret information.

- Clear all registers and flags that have undefined values at the entry to a procedure according to the [AAPCS].

A toolchain could provide the developer with the means to specify that some types of variables never hold secret information.

When the non-secure function call returns, caller- and callee-saved registers saved before the call must be restored.

An implementation need not save and restore a register if its value is not live across the call. Note that callee-saved registers are live across the call in almost all situations. These requirements specify behavior that is similar to a regular function call, except that:

- Callee-saved registers must be saved as if they were caller-saved registers.
- Registers that are not banked and potentially contain secret information must be cleared.

The floating point registers can very efficiently be saved and cleared using the \texttt{VLSMTM}, and restored using \texttt{VLLDM} instructions.

An example instruction sequence for a non-secure call is listed in §7.3.

\subsection*{5.5.2 Arguments and return value}

The callee of a non-secure function call is called in non-secure state. If stack usage is required according to [AAPCS], the non-secure state expects the arguments on the non-secure stack and writes the return value to non-secure memory.

To avoid using the non-secure stack, a toolchain may constrain the following, for a non-secure function type:

- The number of parameters.
- The type of each parameter.
- The return type.

A compiler compiling a call to a non-secure function must do either of the following:

- Generate code to write arguments to and read results from the non-secure stack.
- Constrain the number of parameters to the function, their types, and the type of the return value to avoid needing to use the non-secure stack. A call that would break the constraint must be diagnosed.

If a compiler supports stack-based arguments and results, it must be aware of the volatile behavior of non-secure memory (§3.3.3) and the requirements of using non-secure memory (§5.1), in particular requirement 36.

In practice, a toolchain might generate code that:

- Creates the caller’s stack argument area on the non-secure stack and uses this space for no other purpose.
- Copies the callee’s return value from the non-secure stack to the secure stack after the non-secure function call returns.

Code that performs these tasks must check the non-secure memory as described by the pseudocode in §5.1.

If the return value is read once, a possible optimization would be to read the return value directly from the non-secure stack at the point of use. In this case, access checks are still required.

The stack usage during a non-secure function call is shown in Figure 6.
5.6 Non-secure function pointer

A function pointer that has its LSB unset is a non-secure function pointer (nsfptr). An nsfptr provides a way to test at run-time the security state that will be targeted when performing a call through this pointer. An nsfptr is not a type and must not be confused with the non-secure function type (§5.5).

Most use cases do not require an nsfptr and should use a non-secure function call (§5.5). An example of where an nsfptr is needed is to share a single variable for secure function pointers and non-secure function pointers:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
typedef void __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)) nsfunc(void);

void default_callback(void) { … }

// fp can point to a secure function or a non-secure function
nsfunc *fp = (nsfunc *) default_callback; // secure function pointer

void __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) entry(nsfunc *callback) {
  fp = cmse_nsfptr_create(callback); // non-secure function pointer
}

void call_callback(void) {
  if (cmse_is_nsfptr(fp)) fp(); // non-secure function call
  else ((void (*)(void)) fp)(); // normal function call
}
```

The global variable `fp` is a non-secure function type but can hold the address of a secure or non-secure function. By using the nsfptr related intrinsics it is possible to check at runtime which function call to perform. Such sharing of a variable is not recommended practice.

57 The following intrinsics are defined if bit 1 of macro `__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE` is set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cmse_nsfptr_create(p)</td>
<td>Returns the value of <code>p</code> with its LSB cleared. The argument <code>p</code> can be any function pointer type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cmse_is_nsfptr(p)</td>
<td>Returns non-zero if <code>p</code> has LSB unset, zero otherwise. The argument <code>p</code> can be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
any function pointer type.

Note that the exact type signatures of these intrinsics are implementation-defined because there is no type
defined by [ISOC] that can hold all function pointers. ARM recommends implementing these intrinsics as macros
and recommends that the return type of cmse_nsfptr_create() is identical to the type of its argument. An
example implementation is listed in §7.2.

6  FUTURE EXTENSIONS

This chapter lists possible features of a future version of this specification. It does not imply any commitment.

6.1 Non-secure callable function

A non-secure callable function is a function that is expected to be placed in a NSC region. Its functionality is
identical to an entry function, but instead of a secure gateway veneer the function starts with the SG instruction.

A non-secure callable function must be declared by using the attribute

__attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_callable))
on a function declaration.

A non-secure callable function is identical to an entry function except that:

- The first instruction is an SG instruction.
- The function’s special symbol labels the address following the SG instruction.

No veneer is generated as defined in §3.4.3 because the special symbol’s value is different to the normal symbol’s
value.

Toolchain support is needed to prevent inadvertent secure gateways from occurring (§3.3.4).

A toolchain must provide a way for the programmer to guarantee that a non-secure callable function does not
contain an inadvertent SG instruction in code or data.

ARM recommends that toolchains provide a way to scan NSC regions for inadvertent SG instructions in an
executable image.

6.2 Non-secure returning function

A non-secure returning function is a function that can return to the non-secure state, but cannot be called by the
non-secure state. An example use would be to provide tail-calls from an entry function to non-secure returning
functions.

A non-secure returning function must be declared by using the attribute

__attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_return))
on a function declaration.

A non-secure returning function has a special epilogue, identical to that of an entry function.

7  APPENDIX: EXAMPLE SOURCE

The examples in this chapter are written for clarity and are not guaranteed to be efficient or compact.

7.1 Address range checking intrinsic

An example definition of the address range checking intrinsic with support for CMSE is provided below. Note that
this example assumes the macros CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE and CMSE_AU_NONSECURE are available even when not
targeting the secure state.

```
static inline void *
cmse_check_address_range(void *p, size_t s, int flags)
{
    // check if the range wraps around
```
if (UINTPTR_MAX - (uintptr_t) p < s) return NULL;

cmse_address_info_t permb, perme;
char *pb = (char *) p;
char *pe = pb + s - 1;

// execute the right variant of the TT instructions
const int singleCheck = (((uintptr_t) pb ^ (uintptr_t) pe) < 0x20u);
switch (flags & (CMSE_MPU_UNPRIV|CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE)) {
  case 0:
    permb = cmse_TT(pb);
    perme = singleCheck ? permb : cmse_TT(pe);
    break;
  case CMSE_MPU_UNPRIV:
    permb = cmse_TTT(pb);
    perme = singleCheck ? permb : cmse_TTT(pe);
    break;
#if __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2
  case CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE:
    permb = cmse_TTA(pb);
    perme = singleCheck ? permb : cmse_TTA(pe);
    break;
  case CMSE_MPU_UNPRIV|CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE:
    permb = cmse_TTAT(pb);
    perme = singleCheck ? permb : cmse_TTAT(pe);
    break;
#endif // __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2
  default:
    // CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE is only supported when __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2
    return NULL;
}

// check that the range does not cross MPU, SAU, or IDAU region boundaries
if (permb.value != perme.value) return NULL;
#if ! (__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2)
// CMSE_AU_NONSECURE is only supported when __ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2
if (flags & CMSE_AU_NONSECURE) return NULL;
#endif // !(__ARM_FEATURE_CMSE & 0x2)

// check the permission on the range
switch (flags & ~(CMSE_MPU_UNPRIV|CMSE_MPU_NONSECURE)) {
  case CMSE_MPU_READ|CMSE_MPU_READWRITE|CMSE_AU_NONSECURE:
    return permb.flags.nonsecure_readwrite_ok ? p : NULL;
  case CMSE_MPU_READ|CMSE_AU_NONSECURE:
    return permb.flags.nonsecure_read_ok ? p : NULL;
  case CMSE_AU_NONSECURE:
    return permb.flags.secure ? NULL : p;
  case CMSE_MPU_READ|CMSE_MPU_READWRITE:
    return permb.flags.readwrite_ok ? p : NULL;
  case CMSE_MPU_READ:
    return permb.flags.read_ok ? p : NULL;
  default:
    return NULL;
}
7.2 Non-trivial macros

The following example macro definitions assume the following C language extensions:

- A function pointer can be cast to and from intptr_t.
- A type can be constructed from an expression using the typeof keyword.

```c
#define cmse_check_pointed_object(p, f) \ 
   ((typeof(p)) cmse_check_address_range((p), sizeof(p), f))
#define cmse_nsfptr_create(p)  ((typeof(p)) ((intptr_t) (p) & ~1))
#define cmse_is_nsfptr(p)      (!((intptr_t) (p) & 1))
```

7.3 Example non-secure function call

7.3.1 Simple case

Consider the following example:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
int __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)) (*foo)(int);
int bar(int a) {
   return foo(a) + 1;
}
```

The following T32 instruction sequence is an implementation of this function:

```
bar:
  ldr r1, =foo
  @ protect the FP context if used by secure state
  sub sp, sp, #0x88
  vlstm sp
  @ save callee-saved integer registers
  push {r4-r12, lr}
  @ clear all integer registers (except for function pointer and arguments)
  mov r2, #0
  mov r3, #0
  ...
  mov r12, #0
  @ clear the integer status flags
  msr APSR_nzcvqg, r2
  @ perform the call to the non-secure function
  bic r1, r1, #1
  blxns r1
  @ restore the callee-saved registers
  pop {r4-r12, lr}
  @ unprotect the FP context and restore it if it was pushed
  vlldm sp
  add sp, sp, #0x88
  @ the rest of the function body
  add r0, r0, #1
  bx lr
```

7.3.2 Hard-float ABI

Consider the following example:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
float __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)) (*foo)(float);
float bar(float a) {
```
return foo(a);
}

The following T32 instruction sequence is an implementation of this function using the hard-float ABI:

```assembly
bar:
  ldr     r0, =foo
  @ save callee-saved integer registers
  push    {r4-r12, lr}
  @ save the floating point arguments of the call
  mov     r1, s0
  @ protect the FP context if used by secure state
  sub     sp, sp, #0x88
  vlstm   sp
  @ setup floating point arguments of the call
  mov     s0, r1
  @ clear all integer registers (except for function pointer and arguments)
  mov     r2, #0
  mov     r3, #0
  ...  
  mov     r12, #0
  @ clear the integer status flags
  msr     APSR_nzcvqg, r2
  @ perform the call to the non-secure function
  bic     r0, r0, #1
  blxns   r0
  @ save the floating point result of the call
  mov     r1, s0
  @ unprotect the FP context and restore it if it was pushed
  vlldm   sp
  add     sp, sp, #0x88
  @ restore the floating point result value
  mov     s0, r1
  @ restore the callee-saved registers and return
  pop     {r4-r12, pc}
```

The register $r1$ contains the floating point argument for the non-secure function call. This is not secret information and does not need to be cleared.

The floating point argument to the non-secure function needs to be saved to and restored from an integer register because the `vlstm` instruction saves and clears all floating point registers. The same holds for the return value from the non-secure function because the `vlldm` instruction restores all floating point registers.

### 7.3.3 Arguments and return value on the stack

Consider the following example:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
struct s { int a, int b, int c, int d };
struct s __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_call)) (*foo)(int, struct s);
struct s bar(void) {
  return foo(0, (struct s) {1,2,3,4});
}
```

The following T32 instruction sequence is an implementation of this function:

```assembly
bar:
  @ get the non-secure stack pointer
  mrs     r1, SP_NS
  @ calculate required space for arguments (8 bytes) and return value (16 bytes)
  subs    r2, r1, #24
  @ take permissions at begin and end of range
  tta     r3, r2
  subs    r1, r1, #1
```
tta     r1, r1
@ check if range is in one region (this means identical permissions)
cmp     r2, r3
it      ne
bne    cmse_abort
@ check bit 21 of the TT result (non-secure readwrite flag)
tst     r2, #0x200000
it      eq
bleq    cmse_abort
@ reserve the non-secure stack space
mrs     SP_NS, r2
@ save callee-saved and live caller-saved integer registers
push    {r0,r2,r4-r12, lr}
@ protect the FP context if used by secure state
sub     sp, sp, #0x88
vlstm   sp
@ setup the arguments
mov     r5, #4
mov     r4, #3
str     r5, [r2, #20]
str     r4, [r2, #16]
mov     r3, #2
mov     r2, #1
add     r0, r1, #8
mov     r1, #0
@ load the function pointer
ldr     r4, =foo
@ clear all integer registers (except for function pointer and arguments)
mov     r6, #0
mov     r7, #0
...mov     r12, #0
@ clear the integer status flags
msr     APSR_nzcvqg, r6
@ perform the call to the non-secure function
bic     r4, r4, #1
blxns   r4
@ unprotect the FP context and restore it if it was pushed
vlldm   sp
add     sp, sp, #0x88
@ restore the callee-saved registers
pop     {r0,r2,r4-r12, lr}
@ copy the result value from the non-secure stack to the secure stack
ldr     r1, [r2, #12]
str     r1, [r0, #12]
ldr     r1, [r2, #8]
str     r1, [r0, #8]
ldr     r1, [r2, #4]
str     r1, [r0, #4]
ldr     r1, [r2, ]
str     r1, [r0, ]
@ free non-secure stack space
adds    r2, r2, #24
msr     SP_NS, r2
@ the function body after the call
bx      lr
7.4 Example entry functions

7.4.1 Simple case

Consider the following example:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
int __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) foo(int a) {
    return a + 1;
}
```

In this example the compiler has complete knowledge of the registers used. No floating point registers are used and there is no non-secure stack usage. This case results in a very compact instruction sequence:

```assembly
.global foo
.add r0, #1
.bxns lr
```

Since this is a leaf function, the compiler can determine that all the values in both integer and floating point registers do not contain secure values that need to be cleared. The same reasoning holds for the status flags.

7.4.2 Arguments on the stack and floating point handling

Consider the following example:

```c
#include <arm_cmse.h>
extern int bar(int);
int __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) foo(int a, int b, int c, int d, int e, int f) {
    return bar(e);
}
```

The function `foo()` uses the stack to pass the last two arguments. It is unknown if the function `bar()` uses floating point registers to store secret information.

The following T32 instruction sequence is an implementation of this function using the soft-float ABI:

```assembly
.global foo
.add r0, #1
.bxns lr
```

Since this is a leaf function, the compiler can determine that all the values in both integer and floating point registers do not contain secure values that need to be cleared. The same reasoning holds for the status flags.
tst     r5, #0x100000
it      eq
bleq    cmse_abort
@ 9: copy arguments from non-secure stack to secure stack
ldr     r5, [r4  ]
ldr     r6, [r4, #4 ]
str     r5, [sp, #16]
str     r6, [sp, #20]
.LdoneARGS:
@10: function body
ldr     r0, [sp, #16]
ldr     r1, [sp, #20]
bl      bar
@11: restore used callee-saved registers
pop     {r4-r6, lr}
@12: if called from secure, we are done
tst     lr, #1
it      ne
bxne    lr
@13: pop secure stack space
add     sp, sp, #8
@14: check SFPA bit to see if FP is used
mrs     r1, control
tst     r1, #8
bne     .LdoneFP
@15: clear floating point caller-saved registers (soft ABI)
mov     r1, #0
vmov    s0, s1, r1, r1
vmov    s2, s3, r1, r1
...   
vmov    s30, s31, r1, r1
@16: clear floating point flags
vmsr    fpscr, r1
.LdoneFP:
@17: clear integer caller-saved registers except for return value
mov     r1, #0
mov     r2, #0
mov     r3, #0
@18: clear other registers and the integer status flags
mov     r12, #0
msr     APSR_nzcvqg, r3
@19: return to non-secure state
bxns    lr

The instruction sequence between comment 14 and 15 is an optimization to skip clearing floating point registers if they are not used by the secure state. Removing these instructions is functionally equivalent but might create an unnecessary floating point context.

7.4.3 Return value on the stack

Consider the following example:

```
#include <arm_cmse.h>
struct s { int a, int b};
struct s __attribute__((cmse_nonsecure_entry)) foo(void) {
    return (struct s) { 4, 2 };
}
```

The function `foo` uses the stack to return the structure. The following T32 instruction sequence is an implementation of this function:
.global foo
.global __acle_se_foo
foo:
__acle_se_foo:
  @ 1: if called from secure, memory for the result value is assumed correct
  tst   lr, #1
  bne   .LdoneRES
  @ 2: calculate final address of result value
  adds  r1, r0, #7
  @ 3: take permissions at begin and end of range
  tta   r2, r0
  tta   r3, r1
  @ 4: check if range is in one region (this means identical permissions)
  cmp   r2, r3
  it    ne
  blne  cmse_abort
  @ 5: check bit 21 of the TT result (non-secure readwrite flag)
  tst   r2, #0x200000
  it    eq
  bлев  cmse_abort
.LdoneRES:
  @ 6: function body
  movs  r2, #2
  movs  r1, #4
  str   r2, [r0, #4]
  str   r1, [r0 ]
  @ 7: clear integer caller-saved registers except for return value
  movs  r3, #0
  @ 8: clear integer status flags
  msr   APSR_nzcvq, r3
  @ 9: return to secure or non-secure state (controlled by the LSB of lr)
  bxns  lr

All the code executed in secure state by this entry function is known. The clearing sequence can therefore be optimized. The floating point registers are not cleared and only register r3 holds potentially secret information.