3.16.50.  Authentication Status Register, ETMAUTHSTATUS

The ETMAUTHSTATUS characteristics are:

Purpose

Reports the level of tracing currently permitted by the authentication signals provided to the PTM.

Usage constraints

There are no usage constraints.

Configurations

Available in all PTM implementations.

Attributes

See the register summary in Table 3.16.

Figure 3.53 shows the ETMAUTHSTATUS bit assignments.

Figure 3.53. ETMAUTHSTATUS bit assignments

To view this graphic, your browser must support the SVG format. Either install a browser with native support, or install an appropriate plugin such as Adobe SVG Viewer.


Table 3.64 shows the ETMAUTHSTATUS bit assignments.

Table 3.64. ETMAUTHSTATUS bit assignments

Bits

Description

[31:8]Reserved, RAZ.
[7:6]

Permission for Secure non-invasive debug

See Implementation of the Secure non-invasive debug field for more information.

[5:4]Reads as b00, Secure invasive debug not supported by the PFT architecture.
[3:2]

Permission for Non-secure non-invasive debug.

This field is only implemented if the processor implemented with the PTM implements the Security Extensions. When this field is implemented the possible values of the field are:

b10

Non-secure non-invasive debug disabled.

b11

Non-secure non-invasive debug enabled.

This field is a logical OR of the NIDEN and DBGEN signals. It takes the value b11 when the OR is TRUE, and b10 when the OR is FALSE.

If the processor does not support the Security Extensions, bits [3:2] are reserved, RAZ.

[1:0]Reads as b00, Non-secure invasive debug not supported by the PFT architecture.

Implementation of the Secure non-invasive debug field

It is implementation defined whether a PTM implements the Secure non-invasive debug field. If this field is implemented, its behavior depends on whether the processor implemented with the PTM supports the Security Extensions. If the processor does support the Security Extensions, then the behavior of this field depends on the of the following applies:

  • the processor controls what trace is prohibited

  • the PTM controls what trace is prohibited.

Table 3.65 summarizes this behavior.

Table 3.65. Implementation of the Secure non-invasive debug field

Processor includes Security Extensions?Control of Secure tracingBehavior of Secure non-invasive debug field, bits [7:6]
NoNot applicable when the processor does not support the Security Extensions

The processor is assumed to operate in a Secure state. The possible values of the field are:

b10

Secure non-invasive debug disabled.

b11

Secure non-invasive debug enabled.

The value of this field is a logical OR of the NIDEN and DBGEN signals. It takes the value b11 when the OR is TRUE, and b10 when the OR is FALSE.

YesNot controlled by PTMThe field reads as b00, indicating that the PTM does not control when trace is prohibited.
YesControlled by PTM

The possible values of the field are:

b10

Secure non-invasive debug disabled.

b11

Secure non-invasive debug enabled.

The value of this field is a logical result of:

(SPNIDEN OR SPIDEN) AND (NIDEN OR DBGEN)

It takes the value b11 when the logical result is TRUE, and b10 when it is FALSE. Figure 3.54 shows the logic used to obtain the value of this field.


Figure 3.54. Secure non-invasive debug enable logic when controlled by the PTM

To view this graphic, your browser must support the SVG format. Either install a browser with native support, or install an appropriate plugin such as Adobe SVG Viewer.


Copyright © 1999-2002, 2004-2008, 2011 ARM. All rights reserved.ARM IHI 0035B
Non-ConfidentialID060811